Incentivized advertising is a new ad format that is gaining popularity in digital mobile advertising. In incentivized advertising, the publisher rewards users for watching an ad. An endemic issue here is adverse selection, where reward-seeking users select into incentivized ad placements to obtain rewards. Adverse selection reduces the publisher's ad profit as well as poses a difficulty to causal inference of the effectiveness of incentivized advertising. To this end, we develop a treatment effect model that allows and controls for unobserved adverse selection, and estimate the model using data from a mobile gaming app that offers both incentivized and non-incentivized ads. We find that rewarding users to watch an ad has an overall positive effect on the ad conversion rate. A user is 27% more likely to convert when being rewarded to watch an ad. However there is a negative offsetting effect that reduces the effectiveness of incentivized ads. Some users are averse to delayed rewards, they prefer to collect their rewards immediately after watching the incentivized ads, instead of pursuing the content of the ads further. For the subset of users who are averse to delayed rewards, the treatment effect is only 13%, while it can be as high as 47% for other users.
Introduction
Mobile advertising, including video ads and banner ads in mobile devices, is a dominant segment of digital advertising. In the U.S., businesses spending on mobile advertising accounts for more than 50% of the total spending on digital advertising.
1 The growth of mobile advertising is fueled by the widespread usage of mobile applications or apps (Ghose and Han [2014] ) -it is now commonplace to advertise on mobile apps.
Mobile advertising is also a fast evolving industry, where advertisers and publishers continuously innovate on ad formats, improve data tracking capabilities (Goldfarb and Tucker [2011a,b] ) and optimize ad placements. In recent years, mobile publishers have widely adopted a new format of ad placement, called incentivized advertising. In an incentivized ad placement, publishers reward users for watching an ad. More generally, incentivized ad takes the form of rewarding a user for completing an action related to the ad. 2 Incentivized advertising is also commonly known as reward advertising.
Incentivized ads first appeared among mobile gaming apps. Examples include ad placements where publishers reward users with in-game virtual items, additional game levels and lives, for viewing an ad, typically in a full-screen video format. One of the reasons for using incentivized advertising is to reduce annoyance towards ads, which is of particular concern in mobile advertising. Mobile devices have smaller screen sizes compared to personal computers, and as such it is more difficult to effectively advertise in mobile devices.
For instance, conventional banner ads are very intrusive in mobile devices. Moreover,
1
According to the 2017 Internet Advertising Revenue Report from PricewaterhouseCoopers, spending on mobile ads is $36.6 billions in 2016, while total spending on digital advertising is $72.5 billions.
2 WSJ (Jan 5, 2016), More Marketers Offer Incentives for Watching Ads mobile apps especially mobile gaming apps, rely on a continuous user's experience, so that interstitial full-screen ads do not tend to work well.
3
Incentivized advertising allows the app developer to incorporate advertising into the game-play, for instance, by offering to revitalize an injured game character if the user watches an ad. Therefore incentivized ads allow for a more seamless transition between gameplay and ads, which improves the playability of the game and reduces the annoyance due to interruptions. Moreover, rewarding users to watch an ad could affect the mood of the users, and contribute to an overall positive perception towards the ads. For these reasons, incentivized advertising has become a popular format of advertising within mobile gaming apps. Various industry white papers have reported that incentivized advertising is well-received by users.
4 It has even expanded beyond mobile gaming publishers.
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Despite the increasing adoption of incentivized advertising, little is known about how incentivized advertising affects users' behavior (on the other hand, we have known quite a bit about the effects of other important formats of online advertising, see Bart, Stephen, and Sarvary [2014] , Bruce, Murthi, and Rao [2017] , Manchanda, Dubé, Goh, and Chintagunta [2006] ). To this end, we aim to study the causal effect of incentivized advertising by developing a treatment effect model with unobserved selection. Our goal is to understand and quantify the effect of incentivized advertising on user's conversion rate as compared with non-incentivized advertising. That is, how much ad conversion rate changes as a 3 This is related to the topic of 'viewability' in advertising. c.f. The Economist (March 26, 2016) . Invisible ads, phantom readers. For example, the mobile music streaming app Spotify incentivizes users to watch a video ad with 30 minutes of ad-free music; the video streaming website Hulu incentivizes users to watch a longer video ad with an ad-free episode; the mobile operator Sprint rewards certain users with reduced phone bill for watching ads. 4 result of offering rewards to users for watching ads. From a managerial perspective, this model allows us to ask whether a publisher can obtain higher ad revenue using incentivized or non-incentivized ad placements.
We estimate this treatment effect model using a large impressions-level dataset from a publisher who uses both incentivized and non-incentivized ad placements. This publisher is a mobile gaming app, and incentivized ads take the form of rewarding a user with additional game levels if the user watches a full-screen video ad trailer about another app.
The publisher uses CPI (cost-per-install) 6 pricing for all its ads, so that the publisher is only paid whenever an ad leads to a conversion event, defined as the user installing the advertised app.
The main feature of our treatment effect model is that we allow and control for unobserved adverse selection. When the publisher rewards users for watching an ad, it causes an adverse selection effect where users who are reward-seeking self-select into incentivized ad placements to obtain rewards. In the presence of adverse selection, a user is not randomly assigned to either incentivized or non-incentivized ads, therefore it is important to control for adverse selection in order to properly assess the causal effect of incentivized advertising. If reward-seeking attitude is an observable characteristics, controlling for adverse selection is done using propensity score methods (Section 5).
When there is unobserved adverse selection, we develop and estimate a model where users can endogenously select into watching incentivized ads, and where watching incentivized ads then translates into users' outcomes. This model has two outcomes, an
6
In other forms of online advertising such as sponsored search advertising, it is more common for the publisher to be paid per clicks, see Ghose and Yang [2009] , Hu, Shin, and Tang [2015] , Rutz and Bucklin [2011] , Yao and Mela [2011] , Zhu and Wilbur [2011] ).
intermediate outcome where the user can express an intention to install the advertised app, and a final outcome where the user decides to install the app. In our dataset, we observe both the intermediate and the final outcomes of the users. In the intermediate stage, the user chooses whether or not to click at the end of the ad, which redirects the user to the App Store. In the final stage, the user chooses whether to install the app that was advertised. Identification of the model requires a variable that enters into the selection equation but not the outcome equations, while estimation is implemented using Bayesian MCMC.
Our main result shows that rewarding users to watch an ad has a negative effect on the intermediate outcome (where the user clicks on the ads to proceed to the App Store).
Our explanation is that some users are averse to delayed rewards, and therefore prefer to collect their rewards immediately after watching incentivized ads. As such, rewards have the negative effect of reducing the user's intention to take any action that delays the rewards. The user prefers to collect the rewards immediately instead of going to the App store and installing a new app. We also find that users exhibit varying degrees of aversion to delayed rewards.
On the flip side, we find that rewarding users to watch an ad has a positive effect on install (the final outcome) conditional on clicking the ad (the intermediate outcome). This result is in line with common findings that giving out rewards induces positive effects on products adoption and purchases. In our context, when the publisher gives rewards to its users, they induce the users to perceive the publisher's content more favorably. As such, an ad that is published in an incentivized ad placement is then perceived more favorably by the users, and elicited a more positive response. This particular finding 6 has some basis in the consumer's behavior literature, where researchers have found that consumers' affective feelings of favorability toward the ad itself, is an important predictor of advertising effectiveness and response (Calder and Sternthal [1980] , MacKenzie and Lutz [1989] , MacKenzie et al. [1986] , Mitchell and Olson [1981] ; Shimp 1981). Their findings resonate with our explanation that rewarding users to watch an ad causes users to feel less ad annoyance, and consequently increases the ad conversion rate.
The overall causal effect of incentivized advertising depends on the interplay between the negative effect on clicking and the positive effect on installing conditional on clicking. For our particular publisher, we find that incentivized advertising has an overall positive effect on the ad conversion rate. A user is 27% more likely to install when served incentivized advertising compared to non-incentivized advertising. In terms of ad revenue, this effect is equivalent to a CPM (revenue per thousand of impressions) of $0.413. To give a sense of the industry (mobile ad networks) benchmarks, the average CPMs for the US and China are reported to be $7.00 and $2.70.
7
Our result highlights the benefits of targeting the placement of incentivized ads according to demographics. Rewards have a negative effect on Clicks for the users who are averse to delayed rewards, and therefore the overall treatment effect on Install is heterogenous according to user's characteristics. We find that incentivized advertising is least effective when the device language is set to Russian (effect size of 13%), and most effective for Chinese languages (effect size of 47%). Given the potential cost of giving rewards, the publisher should not use incentivized ads when the effect size is close to zero.
See http://ecpm.adtapsy.com/
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and relevant industry background. Section 3 develops and estimate the model. Section 4 develops an alternative estimator using the propensity scores. Section 5 concludes. The appendix contains all figures and tables.
Data and industry background
The dataset comes from a mobile gaming app. The genre of the app is classified as "Action" in the Android App Store (it is not available in iOS or other operating systems).
The app relies on publishing ads to monetize its user base. It uses both incentivized and non-incentivized ad placements.
In the context of this publisher, we define an incentivized ad to be a video ad that rewards users after the ad has been played. While a non-incentivized ad is a video ad that does not reward users after the ad has been played. Every ad is either incentivized or non-incentivized. The rewards are tied to the game itself (in-app rewards). Typically, the rewards unlock additional levels in the game for the users. 
Adverse selection
Adverse selection is an issue endemic to incentivized advertising. Adverse selection here means the following: users deliberately seek out incentivized ad placements, in order to obtain rewards. For instance, users who know where and when in the game to find ad placements that are incentivized could then seek them out. These reward-seeking users have low intention to install new apps. Incentivized advertising becomes ineffective when adverse selection is severe -users only watch ads to collect rewards and are not converted to install. It remains an open question whether incentivized advertising is effective and should be widely adopted by publishers.
9 eMarketer (December, 2015) . Mobile Advertising and Marketing Trends Roundup On the other hand, adverse selection also poses challenges to data analysis and causal inference. Whenever an ad is served, it appears as an observation in our dataset. Therefore in the presence of adverse selection, our sample of incentivized ads is self-selected and consists disproportionately of reward-seeking users. Since a user is not randomly assigned to either incentivized or non-incentivized ads, estimating the effect of incentivized advertising would be biased. If reward-seeking attitude is an observable characteristics, correcting for selection can be done using propensity score methods. This is accomplished in Section 5. More generally, we develop and estimate a model which allows and controls for unobserved adverse selection in Section 3.
Data and variable description
The dataset contains 365,847 observations generated from the publisher. The timeframe spans from May 1, 2016 to May 31, 2016. Each observation consists of an ad serving instance. An ad serving instance is also commonly called an impression.
Whenever an ad is served, it is recorded as a unit of observation in the database. Note that after the ad has been served, a user can choose not to watch or pay attention to the ad. The user can take some actions such as clicking or installing after the ad has been served, which we observed (outcome variables). We also observe some characteristics of the users (control variables).
Each row of the dataset corresponds to an impression, hence we say that we have impression-level dataset. Now a single user may be served multiple ads by the publisher.
Although we have 365,847 impressions, there are 143,280 unique users. The median user generated only 1 impression, while the average user generated 2.55 impressions (standard deviation of 3.26).
We now describe the treatment and the outcome variables. We also provide some summary statistics of these variables. Each variable is subscripted by i, which we refer to as impression i. In addition to the treatment and outcome variables above, we now describe the control or covariate variables. These variables are the observable characteristics of the users. 
Treatment effect model with unobserved selection
How does rewarding users for watching an ad affect the subsequent action (Install) taken by the user? When users are randomly assigned incentivized (treatment) or nonincentivized ads (control), then the causal effect of incentivized ads can be determined 13 by comparing the outcome of the treatment versus the control group. Here, we do not have the luxury of random assignment, and we must then control for the selection of reward-seeking users into the treatment group (i.e. adverse selection).
When adverse selection is solely attributed to the observable characteristics of the users, estimators based on propensity scores can be used to obtain the treatment effect of incentivized advertising. This is done in Section 5. Here, we undertake a more general treatment effect model that allows for unobserved selection. As a motivation, suppose that there is an unobserved variable v i that measures the degree of rewards-seeking behavior of user i. Users who are more reward-seeking are more likely be self-selected into the treatment group due to the rewards from incentivized ads. This is modeled as Equation
Here, x 1i is a vector of observed characteristics of the user i, and γ is a vector of unknown parameters. The probability that the user i then expresses the intention to install is y
. Now, u i is the utility that a user i enjoys from installing a new app. ǫ 2i is the unobserved taste of the users. If ǫ 2i and v i are correlated, then the assumption underlying the standard propensity score method (Section 5) is violated.
10 In particular, it is likely that v i is negatively correlated with ǫ 2i . That is, a more reward-seeking user is less likely to click on 'install', because the reward-seeking user would rather collect the rewards immediately instead of clicking on 'install' and going to the App store. We will take unobserved adverse selection as meaning that there is a negative correlation between ǫ 1i
and ǫ 2i .
Conditional on clicking on 'install', the user's probability of installing the app is given
, where ǫ 3i is the unobserved tastes that affect users at the App Store (when users could see more information about the app). As before, u i is the utility that the user enjoys from installing a new app. determines when a user would express the intention to install (by clicking on "install").
Unobserved selection
Equation 3 determines when a user would install the advertised app after clicking on "install". Equation 3 can be written more compactly as y i y
α 1 and α 2 measure the effect of incentivized advertising on the pair of outcomes intention and install. (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ) are idiosyncratic preferences unobserved to us, but observed by the users. Crucially, we allow these errors to be correlated with each other. If they are uncorrelated, there is no unobserved selection effect and we can use propensity score methods. It is not feasible to use a two-stage plug-in procedure where we first estimate the selection equation then plug-in the estimates for d i . These equations must be estimated jointly. The joint distribution of (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ) will be specified in the next section. Now we parameterize the utilities as follows: (i) u 1i = x 1i γ, (ii) u 2i = x 2i β, and (iii)
. Now x 1i and x 2i are vectors of covariates that are subsets of x i .
The utility from installing a new app is u 2i = x 2i β. This utility enters into the equations for both Intermediate and Install. We allow this utility to be scaled and translated by w 1 and w 2 when it enters into the equation for Install. The parameter w 1 allows the user to express curiosity or motives for information acquisition. For example, when 0 < w 1 < 1, then the user's utility for the app is magnified during the Intermediate stage, and the user is more likely to click on the ad to find out more about the app in the App Store. At the Install stage, this amplification disappears, and the likelihood of installing the app would just depend on the actual utility for the app plus some noise that represents new information from the App Store.
This formulation of utilities is not crucial to the model. We parameterize the utilities in this manner in order to reduce the number of parameters to be estimated. Even with this structure, we have a high-dimensional set of parameters to be estimated. Almost all our covariates are indicator or categorical variables: whether a user is located at a certain region, whether a user speaks a certain language, etc. For this reason, the formulation u 3i = w 1 · (x 2i β) + w 2 is helpful in reducing the number of parameters. . This endogeneity arises because of the correlation between (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ).
Our framework here differs from the standard approach in that we have an additional outcome variable (Equation 3) that also depends on the endogenous treatment variable.
In a well-known study, Evans and Schwab [1995] estimates the pair of Equations 1 and 2 as a bivariate probit model.
Identification
In the frequentist setting, identification and estimation of the model relies on the presence of an exclusion restriction -an instrumental variable that enters into the selection equation, but does not enter into the outcome equations (see Wooldridge [2002] and Evans and Schwab [1995] ). Now among the variables that are available to us in Section 2.2, it is not clear a priori whether we have an exogenous instrumental variable. Therefore we follow the plausibly exogenous approach of Conley, Hansen, and Rossi [2012] , where we place a near-zero prior on a plausibly exogenous variable. We then estimate the model using Bayesian MCMC.
Specifically, we choose the variable Device Volume as a plausible instrumental variable.
Let the coefficient on Device Volume in Equation 2 be denoted by γ, our prior for γ is
). When δ = 0, Device Volume is a fully valid exclusion restriction in the frequentist sense. We set δ = 0.25, which allows Device Volume to have a small effect in the outcome equation, in particular, the effect of Device Volume is proportionally smaller than the treatment effect α 1 . The idea is that Device Volume enters into the selection equation, but only has a relatively small effect on the user's eventual outcomes. This is reasonable: the user's device volume is recorded at the moment of ad servings. If the user's volume setting is high, she will be less incline to seek out and watch incentivized ads, hence Device Volume affects selection (negatively). Now after the selection stage, the user is free to adjust her volume setting during the ad. Because users adjust their volumes during the ads, the pre-adjusted volume settings should not affect users' outcomes. While the volume settings prevailed during the ads could affect users' outcomes, this volume setting is different from the recorded volume settings, which should not affect users' outcomes.
Scalable Estimation
A desideratum for our estimation procedure is that it must be scalable, in the sense that it must be suitable for impressions-level data. For some popular publisher, impressions-level data means billions of observations in a single day. 11 Estimation entails calculating the likelihood for each impression and summing them up. Moreover, calculating the likelihood for each impression involves modeling the dependence between the unobservables in the selection and the outcome equations (due to adverse selection). We find that modeling the dependence between (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ) as a multivariate Gaussian is too slow in this setting, 
12
With this in mind, we now specify the distributions of (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ) that lead to a tractable likelihood. The marginal distributions of ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i and ǫ 3i are assumed to have the standard logistic distributions. That is, ǫ 1i ∼ Logistic(0, 1), and the CDF of ǫ 1i is
Similarly, the marginal distributions of ǫ 2i and ǫ 3i are both assumed to have the standard logistic distributions. Denote F 1 (e 1 ), F 2 (e 2 ), F 3 (e 3 ) as the marginal CDFs of ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i and ǫ 3i respectively.
To model the dependence between (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ), the joint CDF of (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ) is formulated as C(F 1 (e 1 ), F 2 (e 2 ), F 3 (e 3 )). This is without loss of generality -any joint CDF of (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ) can be written this way (Skylar's Theorem). The function C is known as a Copula. Conversely, when C satisfies some properties, then C(F 1 (e 1 ), F 2 (e 2 ), F 3 (e 3 )) is a valid joint CDF. The idea is to choose a copula that is more tractable than the multivari- . Therefore, when θ is negative, ǫ 1i and ǫ 2i are negatively correlated in the sense of having a negative rank correlation coefficient, which is indicative of unobserved adverse selection. When τ is estimated to be close to zero, (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i ) are uncorrelated, and there is no unobserved adverse selection (we can then use standard propensity score methods). Another commonly used copula is the Gumbel copula, which is a multivariate extension of the familiar Gumbel distribution. We do not use the Gumbel copula because it restricts τ to be positive.
Having formulated the joint distributions of (ǫ 1i , ǫ 2i , ǫ 3i ), we can then derive the likelihood for each impression i according to Equations 1 to 3. The log-likelihood of observing
given Θ, the set of parameters to be estimated, is denoted as
There are 52 parameters to be estimated, and we will describe them in the next section. Due to the choice of our joint distribution, this log-likelihood function can be derived in closed-form. This log-likelihood function can be computed very quickly even when there is a large number of impressions because it does not involve numerical integration.
More importantly, the gradient of the log-likelihood function with respect to the parameters can also be computed with ease. Being able to easily compute the gradient of 20 the target distribution allows us to employ more efficient Markov Chain Monte Carlo algorithms such as Hamiltonian Markov Chain or Metropolis-adjusted Langevin algorithm (MALA) (Roberts and Tweedie [1996] ). These MCMC methods are more suitable here compared to the plain random walk metropolis since we have a moderately large number of parameters. Our MCMC method will be based on MALA. Informally, MALA constructs a random walk that drifts in the direction of the gradient, and hence the gradient enables the random walk to move more efficiently towards regions of high-probability. It also has a Metropolis-Hastings accept/reject mechanism that improves the mixing and convergence properties of this random walk.
For the priors, we impose uninformative priors on all the parameters, except for the parameters corresponding to the instrument variable (Device Volume), and the scale parameter w 1 . The uninformative prior for a parameter is given by the Gaussian distribution with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 100. The scale parameter w 1 has a prior of N(0.5, 0.25). In order to restrict the copula dependence parameter θ to be within [−1, ∞), we apply the transformation θ = f (θ) = (θ + 1) 2 − 1, and subsequently impose an uninformative prior of N(0, 100) onθ.
We ran the MALA Markov Chain 5,000 iterations. Despite such a small number of iterations, convergence occurred quickly, which is not surprising since we have employed a gradient-based MCMC algorithm. Specifically, using the diagnostic of Heidelberger and Welch individually on all parameters, we reject the null hypothesis of non-stationarity for all parameters when the first-half of the chain is discarded as burn-in samples. We report the posterior means and standard deviations after discarding the burn-in samples. This is done in the next section.
Parameter estimates and results
In total, there are 52 parameters to be estimated. We allow the treatment effect for
Intermediate to vary over the main language groups, so that Equation (2) now becomes These are the five major language groups covering over 86% of all impressions. We do not estimate for heterogeneous treatment effects in the Install stage because the number of impressions where both selection and install occurred is much smaller compared to the number of impressions where both selection and clicks occurred.
To summarize, there are 21 parameters to be estimated in the selection equation
. We list these parameters and show their estimates in Table 1 . There are 26 parameters to be estimated in the Intermediate outcome equation
. We describe these parameters and show their estimates in Table 2 . There are 4 parameters to be estimated in the Install outcome equation
. We list these parameters in Table 3 . Finally, we also need to estimate the parameter θ which controls the degree of dependence among the unobserved error terms.
In Section 5.3, we use the standard propensity score method to show that qualitatively similar results are obtained. While our model here controls for unobserved selection, the standard propensity score methods control only for observed selections.
Estimates of the selection equation
Let us elaborate on Table 1 , which reports the posterior means and standard errors of the parameters in the selection equation,
First, we see that θ, the dependence parameter of the copula is −0.353. This translates to a Kendall rank correlation coefficient τ between ǫ i1 and ǫ i2 of τ = θ θ+2 = −0.214. This is an evidence for unobserved adverse selection. There is an unobserved user's characteristic (degree of reward-seeking) that increases the likelihood of selection into treatment, and at the same time, decreases the likelihood of clicking on 'install'.
Looking at the other coefficients in Table 1 , we find that they support an adverse selection narrative. For instance, the coefficient on WiFi is positive -a user with WiFi internet connection is more likely to seek out the incentivized ad treatment. Users are less likely to seek out incentivized ad placements when connected to cellular networks, which are slower and costly.
The coefficient on Device Volume is negative. A user whose device's volume is higher is less likely to seek out incentivized ad treatment. An explanation is that a user would experience more annoyance and discomfort from watching an ad when the volume is higher, and hence, she is more reluctant to seek out incentivized ads.
The coefficient on Screen Resolution is positive. A user who has a better visual experience is less averse to watching ads, and hence is more likely to seek out incentivized ad treatment. The coefficient on Android Version is also positive, suggesting that a user with a more recent Android operating system is more likely to seek out incentivized ad treatment.
Overall, the result from Table 1 shows evidence of adverse selection -users deliberately seek out incentivized ads to obtain rewards.
Estimates of the intermediate outcome equation
Now we examine the estimates for the Intermediate outcome equation, Table 2 reports the posterior means and standard deviations of the coefficients.
We find that the treatment effects vary according to the languages that were chosen by the users. The baseline treatment effect α 1 is significantly negative. Moreover for the users who have chosen English, Spanish and Russian, the treatment effects are significantly negative and larger in magnitudes than the baseline. While the users who have chosen Portuguese and Chinese, the treatment effects are significantly positive.
The negative treatment effect is surprising, as it implies that incentivized ad decreases the probability of clicks compared to non-incentivized ads. That is, for a subset of users being exposed to incentivized ads, they are less likely to go beyond this intermediate step of clicking on the ads, compared to their counterparts in the control group (exposed to non-incentivized ads).
Our explanation is that rewards have negative distortionary effects in the intermediate stage because users prefer not to delay their rewards by clicking on 'install'. These users are averse to delayed rewards. They would rather collect their rewards immediately rather than going to the App Store even though they are sufficiently interested in the advertised app. In the absence of rewards (setting d i = 0), these users would not be distracted away by the rewards, and would actually be more likely to click on the ads and go to the App Store.
For the users whose device languages are Portuguese and Chinese, the treatment effect on the intermediate outcome is positive. The fact that rewards have a positive effect is somewhat less surprising. We will postpone the explanation to the next section when we discuss the final outcome equation.
Estimates of the final outcome equation
We see in Table 3 that α 2 , the treatment effect on Install (conditional on having clicked) is positive. Previously, we also see that during the intermediate stage, the treatment effect on clicks is positive for some users. Therefore, the overall treatment effect for these users are unambiguously positive.
We now offer an explanation for the positive treatment effects of incentivized ads on Intermediate and Install. Research in the consumer's behavior literature (Calder and Sternthal [1980] , MacKenzie and Lutz [1989] , MacKenzie et al. [1986] , Mitchell and Olson [1981] ; Shimp 1981) suggests that a person's affective state (moods and feelings) when he or she watches the ad is an important predictor of advertising effectiveness and purchase intention. The reward, which is given by the publisher, causes the user to perceive the publisher's content more favorably, including the ads that are published therein. Therefore ad conversion is higher when users are being rewarded for watching the ads.
Note that the reward is unrelated to the advertiser's content or product, therefore we can rule out the complementarity between rewards and the advertiser's product. When there is a complementarity, a user could is more interested in the advertiser's app when she is also being rewarded. Now for those users who experienced a negative treatment effect during the Intermediate stage, the overall treatment effect is ambiguous. We will quantify the overall treatment effect in the next section. Our estimation suggests that a user can both experience a negative treatment effect during the Intermediate stage, but a positive treatment effect during the final Install stage. This is not contradictory to our explanation. If the user were to reach the final stage, the aversion to delayed rewards would diminish since there is now a shorter time between Install and the collection of rewards.
Counterfactuals
In the previous section, we have seen that the overall treatment effects are ambiguously signed for some users. Here, we would like to quantify the overall treatment effects. First, we calculate the overall Average Treatment Effect (ATE) on Install implied by the model. The ATE is calculated as follows: for each impression i, we compute the probability that the user would click on 'install' and eventually install, if the user were to be in the treatment group, then minus the probability that the user would click on 'install' and eventually install, if the user were to be in the control group. More precisely, we have:
The ATE measures how much the overall unconditional Install rate would change as a result of comparing two counterfactual scenarios for every impression: (1) when the user's impression is served an incentivized ad, and (2) when the user's impression is served a nonincentivized ad. These changes in the Install rate are then averaged over all impressions to obtain the ATE.
Using the formula in Equation 4, the Average Treatment Effect implied by the model is 0.000795. This is a large magnitude given that the baseline install is 0.00292 (1,067 installs out of 365,847 ad serving). The ATE of 0.000795 represents an increase of 27%. Therefore, a user is 27% more likely to install when served incentivized advertising compared to nonincentivized advertising. Since the publisher is paid per-install, this represents a large increase in ad revenue for the publisher (as well as the platform who shares revenue with the publisher). We have proposed an explanation for why rewards have a positive effect on user's behavior. There is a well-known link between a person's affective state (moods and feelings) during ad exposure, and the subsequent purchase intention. Therefore being rewarded for watching an ad causes the user to feel less annoyed at advertising, which increases ad effectiveness and conversion rate.
How does this ATE translate to ad revenue? We can provide a back-of-the-envelope calculation. The average price per-install commanded by this publisher is $0.52. Hence this ATE translates to 0.000795 × $0.52 = $0.0004134, or $0.413 per thousands of impressions. Ad revenues are frequently measured in terms of CPM (revenue per thousands of impressions). To give a sense of the industry (mobile ad networks) benchmarks, the average CPMs for the US and China are reported to be $7.00 and $2.70. We can also quantify the revenue impact of adverse selection. In the following counterfactual, we remove unobserved adverse selection, that is, we suppose that selection is independent of outcomes.
14 Whether or not an impression is served an incentivized ad is independent of the actions that would be taken during the Intermediate and Install stages. This rules out reward-seeking users who self-select into watching incentivized ads but otherwise they are not interested in the ad itself. The revenue impact of unobserved adverse selection is calculated using Equation 5 below, which amounts to 0.000552, or $0.287 CPM. Therefore, adverse selection negatively impacts publisher's ad revenue.
Estimating treatment effects using propensity scores
In this section, we estimate the treatment effect of incentivized advertising using propensity scores. We want to compare our previous results to other model-free approaches.
Propensity score method can control for selection bias to the extent that selection is based on observables. Therefore it is not valid in the presence unobserved selection, which we have analyzed previously.
Estimation procedure
Identical to the previous data environment, we observe (d i , y τ i , y i , x i ) for the sample of impressions i = 1, . . . , n, where x i is a vector of user's covariates during impression i.
Our estimation procedure consists of two steps. In the first step, we estimate the propensity scores:p i = Pr(d i = 1|x i ), which is the probability that a user is served an incentivized ad during impression i. We estimate the propensity scores using a Probit regression of d i on the user's covariates x i . Note that x i must only contain pre-treatment covariates. Pre-treatment covariates are the user's characteristics that could affect the user's selection into treatment.
In the second step, we constructp i , which are the fitted values of the Probit regression from the first-step. Then, we run the regression of
where µ p is the average value ofp i across i = 1, . . . , n. This is the control function approach explained in Proposition 18.5 of Wooldridge [2002] . Under some assumptions, the ATE on Intermediate can be recovered as the coefficient on the regressor d i when regressing y
. . , n, while the ATE on Install can be obtained as the coefficient on the regressor d i when regressing
In addition, we can include higher order polynomial terms of the propensity scores in order to better control for selection bias (making sure to de-mean the propensity score term before constructing its interaction with d i ). Therefore we also regress y i on 1,
The assumptions needed are explained in Proposition 18.5 of Wooldridge [2002] . We will briefly discuss the main assumption, which is the assumption of "ignorability of treatment" (Rosenbaum and Rubin [1983] ). This assumption is also known as selection on observables. Given observed covariates x: d i and (y 0i , y 1i ) are independent conditional on x i . This assumption implies that E[y 0i |x i ,
There are other methods for estimating the ATE, relying on different assumptions.
We find that these other methods deliver similar results. For instance, the ATE can be estimated as an Inverse Probability Weighted Estimator using the propensity scores. That
(see Proposition 18.3 of Wooldridge [2002] ). One method to compute the ATE that does not rely on the propensity scores is 1 n n ir (x i ), where
First-stage adverse selection estimation
In the first stage, we estimate the propensity scores via a Probit regression. Specifically, the dependent variable is the binary treatment variable Incentivized, or d i . The covariates are Android Version, Wifi, Screen Resolution, Device Volume. We also control for the following fixed effects: Countries, Languages and Device Brands.
The result is given in Table 4 . We find that the result is qualitatively similar to the result obtained from estimating the selection equation (see Section 4.1).
Second-stage treatment effect estimation
Using the first-stage propensity scores, we now estimate the average treatment effects (ATE). We show the result in Tables 5 and 6 . Again, the results obtained here are qualitatively similar to the model-based results.
The ATE on Intermediate is significantly negative, while the ATE on Install is significantly positive. From Column 2 (Intermediate) of Table 5 , the ATE on Intermediate is −0.0635. This means that rewarding users to watch an ad reduces the probability that a user clicks on install by −0.0635 on average. The baseline Intermediate is 0.1344, i.e. 49,179 clicks out of 365,847. An ATE of this magnitude represents almost 50% decrease in the probability that a user would click on install. Now the ATE for Install is statistically significant at 0.00795 (Column 2 of Table 6 ). This is a large magnitude because the baseline Install is 0.0217 (i.e. 1,067 installs out of 49,179 clicks). Therefore an ATE of this magnitude represents 36.6% increase in Install.
In another words, if users are rewarded for watching the ads, they are 36.6% more likely to install the advertised app at the App store.
Compounding the effect of Intermediate, the overall effect on Install is positive and significant. From Column 4 of Table 6 , the overall ATE obtained using the propensity score method here is 0.00187, while the ATE obtained using the model that controls for unobserved selection is 0.000795. Hence, the propensity score method biases the ATE upwards.
Naive treatment effects
In the Appendix (Table 7) , we show results without controlling for any selection bias.
We use probit regressions to show how incentivized advertising is related to (i) the user's probability of clicking 'install', and (ii) the user's probability of installing. We control for all the user's characteristics mentioned in the preceding section. However these regressions are not valid if there is a selection bias. We will not interpret these coefficients further. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 4 . First-stage probit estimation of propensity scores.
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(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 5 . Regressions with propensity score to control for selection bias. The coefficient on Incentivized shows the average treatment effect of incentivized advertising on the Intermediate outcome.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 6 . Regressions with propensity score to control for selection bias. In Columns (1) to (3), we conditioned on Intermediate = 1. In Column (3), the first-stage propensity scores are computed using only the subset of data such that Intermediate = 1.
(1) Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, * * p < 0.05, * * * p < 0.01 Table 7 . Probit regressions without controlling for selection bias. In the last column, we condition on Intermediate = 1.
